Report

March 2019

# BEYOND BLUE HELMETS

## Promoting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Non-UN Peace Operations

Eric G. Berman

small arms survey

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# About the **Small Arms Survey**

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

**For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org**.

Sverige Canada MPOME MAKING PEACE OPERATIONS MORE EFFECTIVE

A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from the Governments of Canada and Sweden

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Cover photo: Lt. Col. Joe Kibet, the spokesperson of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), examines weapons captured from al-Shabaab militants. Halgan, Somalia, 10 June 2016.
Source: AMISOM Photo/Ilyas Ahmed

# About the author

**Eric G. Berman** is the director of the Small Arms Survey. Before joining the Survey he worked for the United Nations (UN) in the Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York as the assistant spokesman for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, as the special assistant to the director-general of the UN Office at Geneva, and as the political affairs officer for the UN International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda). He was also a visiting scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University. He received his Bachelor of Arts (Political Science) from the University of Michigan and his Master of Arts (International Relations) from Yale University. He has published widely on UN and African security issues, with a focus on peace operations and small arms proliferation.

# About the MPOME project

The Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project contributes to the reduction of violence and insecurity due to illicit arms proliferation in conflict zones. Towards that end, the project is working to build a collaborative agenda—with the United Nations, regional organizations, and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs)—to reduce the diversion of arms and ammunition from peace operations. The focus is to improve practices to manage both contingent-owned equipment and recovered materiel.

Phase 1 of the MPOME project (through March 2019) has worked to:

- produce cutting-edge, peer-reviewed research on arms management and losses in peace operations and establish the Survey's Peace Operations Data Set (PODS);
- assist the African Union to develop and implement a new policy to manage recovered weapons in the peace operations it authorizes;
- support regional organizations to operationalize existing (but unimplemented) commitments on the management of arms and ammunition in peace operations;
- consolidate understanding of existing TCC/PCC practices—in particular, good practices—and training needs through a series of regional workshops in partnership with regional organizations that field peace operations and regional training institutions whose mission is to enhance these operations' effectiveness;
- design training modules for strengthening TCC/PCC practices; and
- promote a gender perspective in arms control initiatives in peace operations to strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts.

Phase 2 of MPOME (from April 2019) will further strengthen the sustainability of Phase 1 activities and expand the scope of this work by:

- expanding PODS—including its methodology and web-based interactive map—to enhance the evidence base for reform efforts and to help assess the efficacy of improved practice;

- supporting existing partners and reaching out to new TCCs and PCCs as well as regional organizations authorizing peace operations;
- developing reform and accountability initiatives in peace operations to enhance performance, with an emphasis on applying a gender lens and promoting the women, peace, and security agenda;
- delivering the training and capacity-building efforts promoting arms and ammunition management in peace operations developed in Phase 1 and evolving norms;
- enhancing peacekeepers' participation in illicit arms flows reduction efforts in conflict zones, in line with recent UN directives; and
- identifying practical measures to strengthen the collection and sharing of information and technical weapons intelligence and analysis in peace operations.

The MPOME project is supported by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States Commission, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For more information, please visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/mpome or contact:

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|---|---|
| **ADF** | Arab Deterrent Force (LAS) |
| **AFISMA** | African-led International Support Mission in Mali |
| **AFOR** | Albania Force (NATO) |
| **ALF** | Arab League Force (LAS) |
| **AMIB** | African Mission in Burundi (AU) |
| **AMIS** | AU Mission in the Sudan |
| **AMIS II-E** | AMIS II-Enhanced |
| **AMISEC** | AU Mission in Support of Elections in the Comoros |
| **AMISOM** | AU Mission in Somalia |
| **ANAD** | Treaty of Non-aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence/ *Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matière de défense* |
| **AU** | African Union |
| **AULMEE** | AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea |
| **AUSTF** | AU Special Task Force |
| **BiH** | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| **CAR** | Central African Republic |
| **CEMAC** | Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa/ *Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale* |
| **CEN-SAD** | Community of Sahel-Saharan States |
| **CIS** | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| **CMF** | Commonwealth Monitoring Force |
| **COE** | Contingent-owned equipment |
| **CPAG** | Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group |
| **CPDTF** | Commonwealth Police Development Task Force |

| | |
|---|---|
| **CPKF** | Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS) |
| **CSCE** | Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| **CTSAMM** | Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (IGAD) |
| **DRC** | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| **ECCAS** | Economic Community of Central African States |
| **ECOMIB** | ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau |
| **ECOMICI** | ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire |
| **ECOMIG** | ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia |
| **ECOMIL** | ECOWAS Mission in Liberia |
| **ECOMOG** | ECOWAS Monitoring Group/ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group |
| **ECOWAS** | Economic Community of West African States |
| **ECPF** | Eastern Caribbean Peace Force (OECS) |
| **EJVM** | Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (ICGLR) |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **EUAM** | EU Advisory Mission |
| **EUBAM** | EU Border Assistance Mission |
| **EUCAP** | EU Capacity Building Mission |
| **EUFOR** | EU Force |
| **EULEX** | EU Rule of Law Mission |
| **EUMAM** | EU Military Advisory Mission |
| **EUMM** | EU Monitoring Mission |
| **EUPAT** | EU Police Advisory Team |
| **EUPM** | EU Police Mission |
| **EUPOL** | EU Police Mission |
| **EUPOL COPPS** | EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support |
| **EUSEC RDC** | EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the DRC |
| **EU SSR Guinea-Bissau** | EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau |
| **EUTM** | EU Training Mission |
| **FC-G5S** | Group of Five Sahel Joint Force/*Force conjointe du G5 Sahel* |
| **FLS** | Frontline States |
| **FOMUC** | Multinational Force in the Central African Republic/ *Force multinationale en Centrafrique* |

| | |
|---|---|
| **G5S** | Group of Five Sahel |
| **GCC** | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| **IAPF** | Inter-American Peace Force (OAS) |
| **IATG** | International Ammunition Technical Guidelines |
| **ICGLR** | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| **IEMF** | Interim Emergency Multinational Force (EU) |
| **IFOR** | Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO) |
| **IGAD** | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| **IGASOM** | IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia |
| **ISAF** | International Security Assistance Force (NATO) |
| **JCC** | Joint Control Commission (CIS) |
| **JMC** | Joint Monitoring Commission (OAU) |
| **JPKF** | Joint Peacekeeping Force (CIS) |
| **JVM** | Joint Verification Mechanism (ICGLR) |
| **KFOR** | Kosovo Force (NATO) |
| **LAS** | League of Arab States |
| **LCBC** | Lake Chad Basin Commission |
| **LDF** | Lesotho Defence Force |
| **MAES** | AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros/ *Mission d'assistance électorale et sécuritaire aux Comores* |
| **MAPE** | Multinational Advisory Police Element |
| **MFO** | Multinational Force and Observers |
| **MICEMA** | ECOWAS Mission in Mali/*Mission de la CEDEAO [Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest] au Mali* |
| **MICOPAX** | Mission to Consolidate Peace in the Central African Republic/ *Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique* |
| **MIOC** | Observer Mission in the Comoros (AU)/ *Mission d'observation aux Comores* |
| **MISCA** | African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic/*Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine* |
| **MNJTF** | Multinational Joint Task Force (LCBC) |
| **MOSAIC** | Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium |
| **MOT** | Military Observer Team (OAU) |
| **MPOME** | Making Peace Operations More Effective |

| | |
|---|---|
| **MVM** | Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (IGAD) |
| **NATO** | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| **NF** | Neutral Force (OAU) |
| **NMOG** | Neutral Military Observer Group (OAU) |
| **NNSC** | Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission |
| **NPFL** | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| **OAS** | Organization of American States |
| **OAU** | Organization of African Unity |
| **OECS** | Organization of Eastern Caribbean States |
| **OLMEE** | OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea |
| **OMIB** | Observer Mission in Burundi (OAU) |
| **OMIC** | Observer Mission in the Comoros (OAU) |
| **Op.** | Operation |
| **OSCE** | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| **OSLEG** | Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (SADC) |
| **PCC** | Police-contributing country |
| **PIF** | Pacific Islands Forum |
| **PoA** | Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects |
| **PODS** | Peace Operations Data Set |
| **PSF** | Peninsula Shield Force (GCC) |
| **RAMSI** | Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (PIF) |
| **RCI-LRA** | Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army |
| **RDC/RD Congo** | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| **RENAMO** | Mozambican National Resistance/ *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* |
| **RF** | Russian Federation |
| **RoC** | Republic of the Congo |
| **RSM** | Resolute Support Mission (NATO) |
| **SADC** | Southern African Development Community |
| **SANDF** | South African National Defence Force |
| **SAPMIL** | SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho |
| **SASF** | Symbolic Arab Security Force (LAS) |

| | |
|---|---|
| **SFOR** | Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO) |
| **SOMILES** | SADC Observer Mission to the Kingdom of Lesotho |
| **SOP** | Standard operating procedure |
| **TCC** | Troop-contributing country |
| **UAE** | United Arab Emirates |
| **UAR** | United Arab Republic |
| **UK** | United Kingdom |
| **UN** | United Nations |
| **UNAMID** | African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| **UNDPKO** | United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (now United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO)) |
| **US** | United States |
| **VMT** | Verification and Monitoring Team (IGAD) |
| **WAM** | Weapons and ammunition management |
| **WEU** | Western European Union |

# Preface

This report documents attacks on peacekeepers and other incidents resulting in the loss of arms and ammunition. It is intended to support the development of effective checks and balances to enhance weapons and ammunition management (WAM) practices in peace operations and to promote the development of good practice. The study focuses on non-United Nations (UN) peace operations because they are growing in importance—and they tend to receive less media attention than their UN counterparts. Also, many of these operations have fewer control measures in place to prevent losses of arms and ammunition.

The Survey believes peacekeepers play a vital role in helping to manage and ameliorate conflicts. Knowing more about the challenges peacekeepers face and the effectiveness of various controls on contingent-owned equipment and the lethal materiel recovered by peacekeepers in the course of their important work is critical to improving current practice at a time when peace operations are increasingly challenging and attacks on peacekeepers are growing.

The study is not intended to denigrate the activities of peacekeepers. Many of the incidents of weapons loss recorded involved fatalities of people who willingly put themselves in harm's way to help others in need. Moreover, the Survey is aware that combatants not involved in peace operations have lost substantial quantities of arms and ammunition in conflict zones covered in this report and their losses go unreported—or, more to the point, they go unreported in this study, which focuses on WAM in peace operations and not on larger issues of the causes behind illicit arms proliferation. The loss of lethal materiel in peace operations does not inherently suggest culpability.

It is hoped that this undertaking, as part of the Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, will promote the protection of personnel serving in peace operations and the people they are entrusted to protect. To help focus attention on the challenge facing policy-makers, the names of the troop-contributing countries that have lost materiel have been withheld in this report. The sole exception to this approach

involves instances when the country in question has made it a policy to report publicly on corruption, in order to promote good practice.

The Survey is continually augmenting and refining its Peace Operations Data Set (PODS), on which this report is based. By making the data—and the underlying methodological assumptions—available for comment by experts and practitioners, the Survey is engaging in a fully transparent exercise designed to inform policy and programming relating to the conduct of peace operations. Feedback and more complete information on additional incidents as well as on existing records are most welcome. For more information, please visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/mpome.

Finally, in keeping with Survey practice, the names of countries and territories that appear in the report conform to the Survey's editorial style guide. This means that there are times when a name will appear that does not conform to another organization's usage. We recognize the sensitivities inherent in such matters and appreciate the reader's understanding in this regard.

**—Eric G. Berman**
Director, Small Arms Survey
Geneva, Switzerland

February 2019

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Irvine Aryeetey, Volker Jacoby, Cyrus Oguna, Darren Olivier, and Paul Williams all kindly invested considerable time in closely reading the entire manuscript. They provided important critiques, which I have worked hard to take on board and address.

The report's production profited from the skills of many people. Amelia Feuka and Michael Keller provided valuable research assistance. Amelia, together with Elodie Hainard, contributed thorough and unflinching fact-checking. Copy-editor Alex Potter displayed his usual yeoman effort. The engaging infographic and photos are the result of Emilia Dungel's and Rebecca Bradshaw's creativity and Daly Design's artistic sensibilities.

Stephanie Huitson employed her eagle eyes to proofread the text. The inviting layout is the result of the expertise of long-term Survey designer Rick Jones. Olivia Denonville—again—ably steered the entire process smoothly and efficiently. She also made constructive decisions on how best to present the Annexe.

Any listing of people who assisted in the elaboration of this study would not be complete without highlighting the important and wide-ranging contributions of Jeff Brehm, Emile LeBrun, Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder. Emile and Matt were engaged throughout the report's entire production cycle, and were instrumental in finalizing the outline and fine-tuning key concepts. Mihaela Racovita helped me to research and co-author earlier studies on the loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations. She appositely challenged assumptions and raised important questions that this study sought to address. Jeff helped advance the Survey's PODS, on which much of the report's analysis is based. He also assisted with the research on actors undertaking peace operations and provided timely guidance to interns. The report is considerably stronger as a result of their efforts.

Finally, it is appropriate to recognize the governments that supported the research on which this report is based. I drew on previous studies undertaken with the backing of Denmark, Norway, and the United States, and Canada's generous funding for the MPOME project provided an indispensable foundation and framework to help move this agenda forward. That said, a special note of gratitude goes to Sweden, and to Mans Lundberg and Robert Lejon in particular, who saw the value in developing the Survey's PODS, its underlying methodology, and a stand-alone analysis that focused on losses experienced in peace operations undertaken by organizations other than the UN. Canada's decision to have the MPOME project cover much of the study's publication in English, French, and Spanish is most appreciated.

# Executive summary

The United Nations (UN), with 70 years of peacekeeping experience, garners considerable attention in terms of its successes and shortcomings, as well as the increasing number of challenges it faces. This report looks at the experiences of organizations other than the UN that undertake peace operations, which arguably receive less attention. It focuses on the challenges these organizations face in securing their contingent-owned equipment (COE) and the lethal materiel they recover. The study notes that the challenges facing non-UN actors are as great—or greater—than those facing the world body.

The scale and scope of diversion of arms and ammunition in peace operations that these organizations undertake is very difficult to assess because of imperfect information. Seizures occur as a result of attacks on fixed sites, patrols, and convoy movements (such as deployments, resupply operations, and transfers of recovered materiel). Blockades and the threat of attacks have also led to the forced abandonment of COE. Peacekeepers' residences are known to have been burgled and arms seized. Materiel has also been stolen during shipment and as a consequence of challenging situations and difficult decisions. Corruption and ill-discipline are additional causes of diversion—of both COE and recovered materiel. These are among the most sensitive and challenging circumstances to document.

Nevertheless, it is clear that these various causes have led to the loss of significant quantities of lethal materiel. The Survey has documented at least seven organizations other than the UN that have lost arms and ammunition in missions they have undertaken. Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and various al-Qaeda affiliates are among the armed groups that have seized or otherwise acquired these weapons, which include armoured vehicles. Better information would almost certainly result in a longer listing of both the perpetrators of attacks and the organizations and missions that have been sources of arms and ammunition.

Some of the organizations listed in this report have measures in place to reduce the loss of materiel; many do not. Many control frameworks, however—even those that are legally binding—are ineffectual. Encouragingly, several organizations have recently undertaken activities or stated their intention to address these shortcomings. Making good on existing commitments and aspirations will take significant resources and years of concerted effort, but meaningful incremental progress can be made in the short term.

# Key findings

- More than 25 organizations apart from the UN have deployed more than 100 peace operations to date. In December 2018, 13 of these organizations were fielding more than 50,000 military and police in more than 25 missions.
- Peacekeepers in non-UN missions have lost lethal materiel as a result of seizures—including attacks on fixed sites, patrols, deployment, redeployment, withdrawal, and supply and resupply activities—as well as through burglaries and corruption.
- In just five known attacks on fixed sites of non-UN peace operations the Survey estimates that peacekeepers lost more than 1,000 small arms and light weapons and 1 million rounds of ammunition. The Survey knows of at least ten attacks in which infantry bases in such peace operations have been overrun.
- Armoured vehicles and conventional artillery systems have also been lost in these attacks. On at least one occasion guided light weapons have been seized.
- The diversion of lethal materiel—both COE and recovered arms and ammunition—also occurs as a result of official policies, which may represent a licit or an illicit activity.
- Checks and balances to manage lethal materiel in non-UN peace operations vary considerably. Where they do exist, adherence to oversight mechanisms ranges from spotty to non-existent.
- In the past two years several organizations have begun creating or operationalizing controls on arms and ammunition in peace operations. These initiatives—some of which are legally binding—are at the early stages of development.

> “Attacks on peacekeepers have not just resulted in fatalities (and injuries); they also lead to the loss of COE, including arms and ammunition.”

# Introduction

Since 1948 more than 1,000 UN peacekeepers have died while carrying out their duties as a result of malicious acts (UNOCC, 2018). Lt. Gen. (ret.) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, who commanded UN peacekeeping missions in both Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), emphasized in a powerful co-authored report to the UN in December 2017 that attacks on peacekeepers are likely to continue to grow (dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, and Cusimano, 2017). Had a study been undertaken on the experiences of participants in peace operations that organizations other than the UN have undertaken, it would have turned up similar findings and trends.[1]

Attacks on peacekeepers have not just resulted in fatalities (and injuries); they also lead to the loss of COE, including arms and ammunition. The Survey has shown that the diversion of this lethal materiel is both sizeable and consequential. These weapons are used in attacks on both peacekeepers and civilians. Harder to gauge, but no less important, is the damage sometimes done to the reputations and effectiveness of missions as a result of these losses.

This report has four sections and an Annexe. The first section provides definitions of key terms. The second documents the numerous actors other than the UN that undertake peace operations. The third examines ways in which COE is diverted and explores some of the challenges facing peace operations regarding WAM, including that of how to manage recovered materiel. The fourth section reviews control measures—including voluntary guidelines, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and obligatory commitments—to reduce the loss of both COE and recovered materiel, with a particular focus on procedures that organizations have put in place or are developing. The Annexe to the report provides a list of non-UN peace operations undertaken by 27 organizations, together with the countries that contributed troops and police. The Annexe is intended to be used for reference purposes and to support further research.

The report's goal is to generate an informed discussion of useful changes that could be made to current activities, and to contribute to the development and adoption of good practices.

“The term ‘loss’ . . . is not meant to imply that the forces involved in the incident were engaged in illicit activities or unprofessional behaviour.”

## Definitions

Peace operations come in various shapes and sizes. They include both small missions staffed by a handful of unarmed observers with a limited mandate (such as election monitoring), and large, multidimensional operations with armed infantry battalions and expansive tasks (such as helping to implement a peace agreement). These missions can last a few weeks or many years. Some operations comprise only civilians, police, or military; others are a mixture of all three.

There is little consensus on what constitutes a 'peace operation'.[2] This paper focuses on missions that include uniformed personnel, since civilian-only missions are (for the most part)[3] neither armed nor tasked with recovering or safeguarding lethal materiel. Therefore this report uses the term 'peace operations' to encompass a wide spectrum of missions that may be described elsewhere as peacekeeping operations, peace support operations, or stability operations.[4] Moreover, the term itself often generates considerable disagreement. It is employed here without prejudice or favour. For ease of reference, the Survey's definition of peace operations is included in Box 1.

Similarly, there are no universally accepted definitions for 'small arms' and 'light weapons'. The Survey adopts the approach taken by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts (UNGA, 1997), which focuses on a weapon's portability as the determining characteristic that separates small arms and light weapons from conventional weapons systems. The former can be transported by a single person, a small crew, a pack animal, or a light vehicle, and operated as intended by a single person or a small crew[5] (see Box 1).

Less contentious, but no less important to note, are the report's definitions of 'organization' and 'loss' (see Box 1). Significantly, an organization does not require a standing secretariat (although most have them). It does require a dedicated membership, which makes it different from a collection of countries that band together to form an ad hoc coalition of the willing. For the purposes of this study, in two cases—the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)—the Survey treats groupings of states initially considered ad hoc coalitions of the willing as 'organizations'. This is because the NNSC and MFO have both been operating for more than 25 years.[6] 'Loss' is a very sensitive term in some circles—especially military ones. The Survey uses the term 'loss' to note when the possession of an item changes from an authorized user to an unauthorized one. It is not meant to imply that the forces involved in the incident were engaged in illicit activities or unprofessional behaviour. For the purposes of this report 'diversion' is used as a synonym for 'loss'.

## **Box 1** Definitions

For the purposes of this study the term **peace operation**[7] refers to a mission that deploys police or military personnel abroad[8] that:

- has broad international backing—including support from a regional or international body;
- promotes the reduction of armed violence (for example, by implementing peace accords, enforcing arms embargoes, engaging armed groups, or professionalizing state security forces);[9]
- seeks to maintain internationally recognized national borders and governments—or to support a peace agreement that calls for a possible change to this status quo; and
- is not part of any bilateral military agreement.[10]

**Small arms** include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, carbines, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns. **Light weapons** include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and rockets, and mortars up to and including 120 mm calibre. Small arms include both civilian and military models. The term 'small arms' used in the report may cover light weapons, their ammunition, and accessories. When used, the term 'light weapons' refers only to the light weapons listed above.

For the purposes of this study an **organization** comprises governments that join together formally to support common economic, political, or security concerns in an area that need not be geographically defined, and whose members are expected to contribute regularly towards the body's operating costs and the implementation of its mandates. A functioning permanent secretariat is not a defining characteristic.

**Loss** or **diversion** (the two terms are used interchangeably) is defined here as the unauthorized change in possession or end use of legally held or transferred weapons, ammunition, parts, or explosives.

“A number of . . . organizations have mandates that focus primarily on development and economic concerns, and exercise little oversight over materiel brought into the missions they undertake.”

## Actors

Besides the UN, 27 organizations have undertaken more than 100 peace operations (see Table 1).[11] Four of these organizations—the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—are well known, as are many of the missions they have undertaken. The other 23 organizations are perhaps less immediately identifiable, and five no longer exist.[12] The 18 remaining organizations have deployed more than 40 peace operations.[13] All told, 17 organizations have undertaken peace operations with more than 1,000 armed uniformed personnel; ten have fielded missions of 10,000 or more armed peacekeepers.[14] In December 2018, 13 non-UN organizations were fielding 28 peace operations with more than 50,000 military and police (see Annexe).[15] For the purposes of this report the Survey does not count the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as among these non-UN missions, and the peacekeepers participating in this operation are not included here, but examples of losses incurred in the mission are included in the section on 'Challenges'. A number of these organizations have mandates that focus primarily on development and economic concerns, and exercise little oversight over materiel brought into the missions they undertake.

More than 160 states have contributed military and police to these missions (see Annexe). Apparently, more UN member states have contributed uniformed personnel to non-UN missions than to UN peacekeeping operations.[16] In addition, nine non-state actors and states that are not UN member states have participated in these operations.[17]

Many states participate in peace operations authorized by organizations of which they are not members. Examples include Tanzania and Uganda in the initial ECOWAS mission in Liberia, Benin in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to counter Boko Haram, and France in the Commonwealth mission in South Africa. The EU and NATO have undertaken missions in which, all told, more than 30 non-member states have contributed military or police forces (Berman and Brehm, 2018).[18] States also form one-off alliances outside of any existing organization to carry out peace operations, which are frequently called 'ad hoc coalitions of the willing'. A comprehensive overview of them is outside the scope of this paper, but the operations listed in Table 2 provide a sense of the scale and duration of these missions, as well as the challenging regions and conflicts in which they operate.[19]

**Table 1** Peace operations undertaken by organizations other than the UN*

| Organization | Peace operations deployed (as of 31 December 2018) | | | | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | First (year) | Maximum strength | Any armed personnel? | |
| ANAD | 1 | 1986 | 15 | No | ANAD closed its doors in 2001. Its sole peace operation consisted of a small—and short-lived—unarmed observer force. |
| AU | 10 | 2002 | 22,000 | Yes | The joint AU–UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is not included in these figures—nor are AU-authorized but not AU-led missions. |
| CEMAC | 1 | 2003 | 500 | Yes | CEMAC, which took over from the CEN-SAD mission in CAR, subsequently 'handed over the keys' to ECCAS. |
| CEN-SAD | 1 | 2001 | 300 | Yes | CEN-SAD authorized a second, subsequent, peace operation to address the conflict in Darfur, but it never deployed. |
| CIS | 4 | 1992 | 32,000 | Yes | CIS missions have included the participation of non-UN member states North Ossetia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. |
| Commonwealth | 3 | 1979 | 1,300 | Yes | The Commonwealth's third peace operation, which deployed in 1998 and concluded in 2000, was its longest mission. |
| CSCE | 1 | 1992 | 10 | No | The CSCE, which ceased operations in 1994, deployed a small group of unarmed military observers in its mission to Georgia. |
| ECCAS | 1 | 2008 | 2,000 | Yes | ECCAS is working to operationalize its small arms convention to manage its members' COE in peace operations. |
| ECOWAS | 8 | 1990 | 16,000 | Yes | ECOWAS is working to operationalize its small arms convention to manage its members' COE in peace operations. |
| EU | 27 | 2003 | 7,000 | Yes | In addition to the EU's 28 members, 17 other states have contributed military or police to its 27 peace operations. |

| Organization | Peace operations deployed (as of 31 December 2018) | | | | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | First (year) | Maximum strength | Any armed personnel? | |
| FLS | 1 | 1986 | 30,000 | Yes | The FLS, which ceased to exist in 1994, aided TCCs that supported the Mozambican government in its conflict with RENAMO. |
| G5S | 1 | 2017 | 5,000 | Yes | In 2017 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2359, which welcomed the force's deployment. |
| GCC | 3 | 1990 | 30,000 | Yes | The smallest of the three PSF missions was 5,000 strong. Only GCC member Kuwait has not been a TCC. |
| ICGLR | 2 | 2008 | 30 | No | The EJVM includes military officers from all 12 ICGLR member states and South Africa. |
| IGAD | 3 | 2003 | 200 | No | IGAD authorized a fourth mission in Somalia (to be known as IGASOM), but it did not deploy. It would have been armed. |
| LAS | 4 | 1961 | 30,000 | Yes | In the past 35 years LAS has deployed only one peace operation, which was unarmed and lasted one month. |
| LCBC | 2 | 1998 | 10,000 | Yes | The LCBC's first MNJTF, along the Chad–Niger border, was much smaller than its second one in the north-east Nigeria area. |
| MFO | 1 | 1981 | 2,700 | Yes | The MFO's North Camp was attacked in Sept. 2012 and its perimeter breached. The MFO claims no lethal materiel was lost. |
| NATO | 15 | 1992 | 130,000 | Yes | In addition to NATO's 29 allies, 26 other states have contributed military or police to its 15 peace operations. |
| NNSC | 1 | 1953 | 750 | Yes | Of the original four participating countries, only two—Sweden and Switzerland—still provide uniformed personnel (five each). |

| Organization | Peace operations deployed (as of 31 December 2018) | | | | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | First (year) | Maximum strength | Any armed personnel? | |
| OAS | 7 | 1969 | 14,000 | Yes | The OAS authorized its last peace operation more than 40 years ago. Most of its missions have been small and unarmed. |
| OAU | 11 | 1980 | 3,500 | Yes | The OAU ceased operations when the AU became operational in 2002. Most OAU missions were small and unarmed. |
| OECS | 1 | 1983 | 400 | Yes | The OECS mission included uniformed personnel from three non-OECS members: Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States. |
| OSCE | 4 | 2001 | n/a | No | Uniformed personnel have been part of only four OSCE missions. It was not possible to ascertain their various strengths. |
| PIF | 1 | 2003 | 2,000 | Yes | Two non-UN members—Cook Islands and Niue—participated in the PIF's RAMSI mission, which closed in June 2017. |
| SADC | 4 | 1998 | 18,000 | Yes | Formal decision-making processes and oversight for SADC's first two missions, both launched in 1998, were laissez-faire. |
| WEU | 4 | 1987 | n/a | Yes | The WEU ceased to exist in 2011. The two WEU mine-clearing missions are not included as 'peace operations'. |

Notes: * See the 'List of abbreviations and acronyms' for the full names of organizations, peace operations, and countries given in abbreviated form in the table.

Headers:

'No.' = number of missions fielded.

'First (year)' = year the organization's first mission was authorized or deployed.

'Maximum strength' = approximate number of uniformed personnel in the largest peace operation(s) of the organization in question.

'Any armed personnel?' = 'yes' if at least one mission included armed personnel, 'no' if no personnel were armed.

Source: Berman and Brehm (2018)

**Table 2** Examples of ad hoc peace operations undertaken by neither the UN nor organizations*

| Mission name | Area(s) of operation | Years of operation | Strength[a] /armed? | Police- and/or troop-contributing countries |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operation Turquoise | Rwanda | 1994 | 3,000 armed | **8** Chad, Egypt, France, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, RoC, Senegal |
| Military Observer Mission Ecuador–Peru (MOMEP) | Ecuador–Peru | 1995–97 | 100 armed | **4** Argentina, Brazil, Chile, US |
| Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB) | CAR | 1997–98 | 800 armed | **6** Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Togo |
| International Force East Timor (INTERFET) | Indonesia [East Timor] | 1999–00 | 12,000+ armed | **22** Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, UK, US |
| Joint Military Commission (JMC) | Sudan [Nuba Mountains] | 2002–05 | 20 unarmed | **11**[b] Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US |
| International Monitoring Team (IMT) | Philippines [Mindanao] | 2004–present | 60 armed | **4**[c] Brunei, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia |
| Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) | Border areas of CAR, DRC, and South Sudan | 2011–present | 3,400 armed | **4**[d] CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda |

Notes:

* See the 'List of abbreviations and acronyms' for the full names of countries given in abbreviated form in the table.

[a] Strength = the approximate number of uniformed personnel when the mission reached its maximum strength.

[b] The Sudan People's Liberation Army also provided uniformed observers to this mission.

[c] The EU, Japan, and Norway contribute non-uniformed experts to the team.

[d] The United States provided military advisers to support the RCI-LRA.

Sources: Berman and Sams (2000, pp. 228, 411); Higgins (1997, pp. 2, 44–45); Ibscher and Szili (n.d., pp. 76, 90–94); IMT (2011); Larose-Edwards (1994, pp. 8–9); Nautilus Institute (n.d.); Ryan (2000, pp. 127–29); Souverijn-Eisenberg (2005, p. 4); UNSC (1997, para. 17); Unson (2008; 2017); WPF (2017, p. 4)

“Seizures occur as a result of attacks on fixed sites, patrols, deployments, redeployments, and withdrawals, and during supply and resupply activities . . . The Survey has documented at least seven organizations other than the UN that have lost arms and ammunition in missions they have undertaken.”

## Challenges

The scale and scope of diversion of arms and ammunition in peace operations is very difficult to assess because of imperfect information. Seizures occur as a result of attacks on fixed sites, patrols, deployments, redeployments, and withdrawals, and during supply and resupply activities (which do not always involve peacekeeping personnel).[20] Blockades and the threat of attacks have also resulted in the forced abandonment of COE. Moreover, peacekeepers' residences are known to have been burgled and arms seized. Materiel has also been stolen during shipment and as a result of challenging situations and difficult decisions in the field. Corruption and ill-discipline are additional causes of diversion—of both COE and recovered materiel (these are among the most sensitive and challenging circumstances to document).

Nevertheless, it is clear that these various causes have resulted in—at a minimum—the loss of hundreds of light weapons, thousands of small arms, and millions of rounds of ammunition. Losses incurred in the joint AU–UN operation in Somalia are included in this report, but this headline finding would still be true if losses from UNAMID were omitted. The Survey has documented at least seven organizations other than the UN that have lost arms and ammunition in missions they have undertaken (see Infographic 1). Better information would almost certainly result in a longer list. The Survey believes that two additional organizations other than the UN have likely fielded missions that have resulted in the loss of lethal materiel (see Box 2). At least two ad hoc missions are known to have lost arms and ammunition.

Below are examples of these various types of diversion in non-UN peace operations.[21]

YouTube video still showing members of local communities climbing up a guard post inside the MFO North Camp after having breached the facility's perimeter fencing, September 2012. Source: Alfares Alshares/YouTube

**Box 2** Other non-UN organizations that likely lost lethal materiel in peace operations

The Survey has been able to document arms and ammunition lost in peace operations undertaken by seven organizations other than the UN: the AU, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), ECOWAS, the EU, the LCBC, NATO, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Small Arms Survey, n.d.). The Frontline States (FLS) and MFO should likely be added to this list.

The FLS operation in Mozambique resulted in troop-contributing countries (TCCs) losing dozens—if not hundreds—of troops. Many Zimbabweans referred to their country's engagement in Mozambique (1986–92) as 'our Vietnam' (Vines, 1991, p. 62). (The United States lost more than 50,000 soldiers in Vietnam, as well as considerable lethal materiel.) Zimbabwe's deployment in Mozambique as part of the FLS effort was the largest and longest among the three countries that participated in the joint effort to counter the Mozambican National Resistance (known by its Portuguese acronym RENAMO). The Survey, however, has not been able to document that RENAMO seized weapons or ammunition from Zimbabwe's uniformed personnel serving in Mozambique or from forces of the two other TCCs, each of which also suffered casualties.

The MFO was attacked in September 2012. Media accounts report that the attackers breached an outer wall of the mission's North Camp (which video footage appears to substantiate) and that ammunition was seized (Khoury et al., 2012; Roggio, 2012; Lazareva, 2013). An MFO official denies that lethal materiel was taken, however.[22] This may be a result of incomplete reporting. The Survey, however, has not labelled the incident as a 'notable event', in deference to the MFO denial and the lack of specificity in open sources as to what exactly was seized and in what amounts. An eyewitness to the attack was unable to substantiate media accounts, but did not deny that ammunition may have been seized.[23]

The Survey believes that other organizations likely undertook missions that have resulted in losses of lethal materiel.

## Materiel seizures resulting from attacks

### Attacks on fixed sites

Non-UN missions have suffered numerous attacks on fixed sites. The Survey is aware of at least ten instances in the areas of operation of three different missions in which attacks have resulted in a base being overrun and the force's stores looted. This is almost certainly a significant under-estimate of the scale and scope of the challenge.[24] During the AU Mission in the Sudan II-Enhanced (known as AMIS II-E), a military group site was looted in September 2007 (Berman and Racovita, 2015, p. 72). Attackers overran an MNJTF sector headquarters in January 2015 (BBC, 2015)—and again in December 2018 (Maclean, 2018). Other MNJTF infantry bases were looted in June 2016 (Al Jazeera,

2016), January 2018 (Aksar, 2018; Maina, 2018), July 2018 (Idris, Leo, and Matazu, 2018; News24, 2018), and November 2018 (Burke, 2018). And in June 2015 and January 2016 two AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward-operating bases were overrun (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017, p. 37). An infantry base of an AMISOM TCC was overrun in Somalia in January 2017 (BBC, 2017; Waddington, 2017), although apparently the base was not formally part of the mission.[25] It is included here because the troops were deployed in support of AMISOM, and insurgents seized materiel.

The loss of materiel from these attacks has been considerable. In just half of the ten attacks listed above the Survey estimates that the perpetrators—including al-Shabaab and Boko Haram—secured more than 1,000 small arms and light weapons and 1 million rounds of ammunition (Small Arms Survey, n.d.). The strength of the formed units at some bases is not clear, but most of the sites hosted infantry companies, with the two sector headquarters likely having numerous support units and supplemental stores. One incident is reported to have involved an infantry battalion (comprising three or four companies). Seized light weapons included anti-tank rockets, mortars of various sizes, and heavy machine guns (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017, pp. 30, 37, 62; BBC, 2015). Armoured vehicles have also been seized in these and other attacks,[26] including armoured personnel carriers and main battle tanks, as have artillery systems.

## Attacks on patrols

Attacks on patrols are much more frequent than attacks on fixed sites, but are more difficult to track because the media do not report on them as frequently or as thoroughly. These attacks tend to occur in remote areas where journalists are largely absent. Moreover, if the attacks do not inflict significant casualties, they tend to generate little media interest, and TCCs and police-contributing countries (PCCs) have little incentive to publicize such incidents. During the 1990s numerous attacks on peacekeepers serving in ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone while on patrol (as well as on convoys and fixed sites) resulted in the loss of arms and ammunition.[27] Outside of Africa, a NATO patrol carried out by troops of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) TCC in Afghanistan came under attack in August 2008, and ten ISAF soldiers were killed (Smith, 2018). The Survey assumes that the Taliban seized at least ten weapons, because the TCC in question did not recover the bodies of its soldiers until the following day (Smith, 2018).

## Attacks on convoys and troop movements

Attacks on force deployments, redeployments, and withdrawals are also known to have resulted in losses of materiel. Two notable attacks on troop movements are worth flagging here. In May 1994 two companies serving in the ECOWAS mission in Liberia came under attack when travelling by road as part of a convoy. The 300-strong force was

**Infographic 1** Selected notable incidents of weapons and ammunition losses in peace operations not undertaken (solely) by the UN, 1990–2018



A tank with Boko Haram insignia in Yola, Adamawa, after being retaken by the Nigerian army, May 2015. Source: Mohammaed Elshamy/Anadolu Agency/AFP Photo

disarmed (Howe, 1996, p. 169). A more recent incident was the October 2011 al-Shabaab attack on AMISOM troops redeploying outside of Mogadishu. The Survey estimates that the AMISOM troops in question lost some 75 small arms and light weapons, and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition (Small Arms Survey, n.d.).[28]

Lethal COE has also been diverted from resupply convoys. A UNAMID convoy was attacked en route from El Obeid to Nyala in Sudan in April 2008. Some 12 tons of ammunition—or roughly 600,000 cartridges—destined for an engineer battalion in the mission were seized (Berman and Racovita, 2015, p. 76). While losses on this scale may not be routine, instances of losses incurred during logistical support operations are not unknown. For example, in the early years of the ECOWAS mission in Liberia that commenced in 1990, members of Prince Yourmie Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia seized an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) truck transporting ammunition (James, 1992, p. 138).

Peacekeepers have also lost arms and ammunition recovered from armed groups as a result of attacks. In September 1994 forces of the rebel United Liberation Movement for Democracy led by Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J) attacked an ECOMOG convoy transporting a container of almost 500 weapons that the peacekeeping mission had secured from rebels. The peacekeepers in the convoy were also relieved of their own equipment (UNSC, 1994, para. 31).

## Diversion and loss due to other causes

### Burglary and robbery

Lethal (and non-lethal) materiel in peace operations is also lost through burglaries and robberies. For example, there were several reports of UNAMID peacekeepers' residences being broken into. The UN reported that several of these burglaries resulted in personal effects being taken (such as uniforms, money, and communications equipment), but did not explicitly list the loss of arms or ammunition (Berman and Racovita, 2015, Annexe B, pp. 100–17). The Survey understands that instances did occur when firearms were lost in this way, but cannot document a specific incident. Equipment is also known to have been lost during shipment. In March 2014 almost 100 small arms and more than 40,000 rounds of ammunition destined for the EU Border Assistance Mission were stolen at the airport in Tripoli, Libya (UNSC, 2015, Annex 20, p. 99).

### Airdrops

The Survey knows of at least one instance in which a peacekeeping mission lost materiel during a series of airdrops to its troops that were cut off from being resupplied by road or water. In November 1999 a contingent of the SADC force participating in Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG), which supported the DRC president, found itself trapped at the airport in Ikela (around 1,000 km north-east of Kinshasa) surrounded by hostile parties to the conflict. Reports from the period put this unit's strength at between 700 and 2,000 (BBC, 1999). Negotiations to give the besieged SADC personnel safe passage out of the area in exchange for giving up their weapons (IOL, 1999) and efforts to break the blockade were unsuccessful.[29] The situation of the SADC contingent was dire. Aircraft of a SADC TCC airdropped supplies to the besieged forces (IOL, 1999), which controlled a defence perimeter less than a kilometre wide (Cooper, 2016, p. 56). The Survey assumes that considerable lethal and non-lethal materiel landed outside the defence perimeter during these airdrops and was secured by hostile forces over the nearly three-month siege. In early February 2000 OSLEG troops and DRC forces succeeded in breaking the blockade and freeing the forces (UNSC, 2000, para. 30). Whether any materiel was left behind is unclear[30]—a subject to which we now turn.

### Forced abandonment

Forced abandonment differs from seizures in that peacekeepers lose materiel for reasons other than attackers' employing direct or indirect lethal force. In September 1992 Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) detained 580 ECOMOG troops. The peacekeepers were allowed to leave NPFL-controlled territory and return

to Monrovia only after turning over their weapons and vehicles (HRW, 1993). In June 1997 troops of a TCC from the ad hoc peace operation known as MISAB (the French acronym for the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords) in the Central African Republic (CAR) withdrew from their position in Bangui in the face of advancing mutineers and civilians and left some lethal materiel behind (Berman, 2008, p. 67). Troops serving in the ECOWAS mission in Sierra Leone are known to have decided on more than one occasion to abandon large quantities of ammunition when faced with advancing rebels and retreat was deemed to be a strategic necessity (Adeshina, 2002, pp. 128–34). In December 2000 some 300 OSLEG troops were reported to have left Pweto in southern DRC in response to heavy fighting in the vicinity, and crossed the border from the DRC into Zambia with thousands of refugees. The opposing forces claimed that the amount of weaponry the retreating OSLEG troops left behind was 'enormous' (ICG, 2000, p. 8). In October 2008 a TCC contingent participating in ISAF in Afghanistan was forced to abandon weapons in the face of an attack (Flade, 2010). More recently, in July 2016, another NATO contingent in Afghanistan participating in the successor to ISAF, the Resolute Support Mission, acknowledged that it had abandoned equipment, including lethal materiel (Buncombe, 2016; Starr, 2016).

The absence of a clash or casualties makes the diversion of lethal materiel very difficult to document. The UN reimbursement framework provides an incentive for TCCs/PCCs that have suffered losses due to forced abandonment to report them through official channels. Yet the Survey knows of no organization outside of the UN that provides any financial incentive to report such losses (although other incentives exist, at least on paper; see below). In the case of the 2008 attack on ISAF mentioned above, however, the TCC's troops are reported to have lost a guided anti-tank launcher and two missiles (Flade, 2010).

## Authorized licit and illicit transfers

Peacekeepers also deliberately give COE to other parties. There are numerous instances of transfers to state and non-state groups that occur as part of the official policy of either the body authorizing the mission or one or more of its TCCs. In the first ECOWAS mission in Liberia, for example, former force commander Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo acknowledged that ECOMOG units handed over arms and ammunition to both the Government of Liberia and some armed groups to counter the rise of Charles Taylor and his NPFL (Gbanabome, 1999). In this context early transfers would not have been illegal because they would have occurred before the UN Security Council authorized an arms embargo in November 1992, which applied to all parties in Liberia except the peacekeeping forces (UNSC, 1992, paras. 8–9). But according to Lt. Gen. Quainoo, these transactions continued after the embargo (Gbanabome, 1999).[31] States participating in the ECOWAS and AU missions in Sierra Leone and Somalia, respectively, are reported

to have also made available materiel—both their own and that which they recovered—to militias and government forces, sometimes in contravention of UN embargoes, but as part of official policies.[32] More recently, troops in the EU mission in CAR—which was known as EU Force (EUFOR) RCA—provided riot-control materiel to the national police.[33]

## Corruption

Corruption within peace operations is an even more sensitive topic than the loss of weapons and ammunition through seizure, neglect, and poor performance.[34] Most militaries and police forces across the world take the loss of arms issued by the state to their men and women in uniform very seriously—whether it occurs at home or abroad. The selling, bartering, or renting of small arms and light weapons issued to peacekeepers is not something the Survey has come across in its research to date. Peacekeepers are reported to have sold weapons in peace operations, but not necessarily their state-issued arms. Examples include personnel from an AMISOM TCC and troops returning from an ad hoc mission in the DRC[35] who sold arms (and ammunition) across the border in CAR.[36] Peacekeepers do occasionally engage in illicit sales of their ammunition and non-lethal material, such as fuel and rations. This is known to have occurred in AMISOM, for example.[37] Moreover, comparatively little attention has been paid to the selling of arms and ammunition that peacekeepers have confiscated.

## Poor management of recovered materiel

Peacekeepers recover considerable quantities of arms and ammunition while carrying out their activities.[38] They do so as a result of clashes with negative forces, cordon and search operations, and unexpected discoveries of weapons caches, while for more personal reasons they purchase or otherwise procure souvenirs. Peacekeepers are occasionally also asked to provide safekeeping for lethal materiel as a temporary conflict mitigation measure, such as securing free passage for forces of a party to a conflict.

Sometimes oversight of recovered materiel is quite stringent and comprehensive. This seems to be the case in the Gambia, where ECOWAS peacekeepers came across significant quantities of small arms and ammunition at former president Jammeh's residence and office.[39] This materiel has reportedly been well documented and guarded.[40] NATO is known to have recorded and secured significant amounts of materiel it collected during its missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, and Macedonia. In BiH alone NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) reportedly recovered at least 20,000 arms and more than 7 million rounds of ammunition, which it destroyed (Perry, 2004, p. 6).[41]

At other times oversight of recovered materiel—or materiel that was intended to be controlled—is more problematic. In Operation Boleas (the first SADC peace operation)

Illegally owned rifles being destroyed as part of an arms collection organized by the NATO-led SFOR, Banja Luka, April 2004. Source: Milan Radulovic/AFP Photo

## **Box 3** Weapons recovered during Operation Boleas

In September 1998 soldiers from Botswana and South Africa entered Lesotho as part of a SADC peacekeeping force known as Operation Boleas. Four months earlier Lesotho had held national elections, the results of which were hotly contested and ushered in considerable and mounting discontent. Junior officers of the LDF eventually rebelled. Lesotho's prime minister requested—and received—support from SADC heads of state to have SADC help to restore order. Leaving aside the question of whether the SADC decision-making framework was followed (Berman and Sams, 2000, pp. 163–66), it is clear that the ensuing SADC peace operation was initially ill prepared for the task at hand. Indeed, the South Africa military continues to use Operation Boleas as a case study for how not to conduct a peace operation. The rebelling LDF troops—and many civilians—fought hard against the 'invading force'. Nonetheless, over the course of the mission the SANDF secured vast numbers of arms and ammunition from LDF stocks. The SANDF's official record of recovered weapons is as follows (as received):

1. *2 × Field Artillery Guns 88mm (25 pounder)*
2. *3 × Anti-Aircraft Machine guns (14.5mm)*
3. *9 × Mortar tubes (81mm)*
4. *4 × Mortar tubes (82mm) Russian*
5. *7 × Mortar tubes (60mm)*
6. *4 × Recoilless Anti-Tank gun 106mm*
7. *11 × RPG-7 launchers*
8. *3 × RPG- 2 launchers*
9. *7 × Medium Machine guns 12.7 mm Browning*
10. *46 × Light Machine Guns including the following:*
    *a. 7.62mm MAG; b. 7.62 mm RPD (Russian); c. 7.62 mm RPK, PKM. (Russian or Chinese)*
11. *659 × Assault Rifles including the following:*
    *a. Galil; b. R4; c. G3; d. AK 47; e. AK 74; f. FN FAL*
12. *56 × Sub Machine Guns including the following:*
    *a. Uzi; b. PPSh;*
13. *11 × Sniper rifles including:*
    *a. FN FAL; b. Heckler & Koch; c. Dragunov (Russian)*
14. *44 × civilian Hunting Rifles*
15. *18 × Shotguns civilian and LDF*
16. *64 × Pistols civilian and LDF*
17. *17 × Revolvers civilian and LDF*
18. *33 × Homemade rifles*
19. *7 × Signal flare guns*

Source: Gibson (2018)

the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) recovered large quantities of materiel from the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) (see Box 3). The South African Parliament issued a report on the situation in Lesotho some two months after the start of the peace operation and noted that SANDF units had arrived ill prepared and that there had been no plan to address the looting that had taken place in Maseru (PMG, 1998). While the SANDF quickly and capably secured the LDF military base at Ratjomose, it had a more difficult time taking control of the facility at Makoanyane (Scherman, 2015, pp. 59–74), which was plundered after soldiers there put up fierce resistance. While the SANDF managed to secure a considerable amount of materiel in the wake of its initial deployment, some three weeks later mutineers claimed to have some 2,000 assault rifles in their possession, together with other lethal materiel (*M&G*, 1998). In 2001 South Africa, in collaboration with Lesotho, destroyed nearly 4,000 weapons in LDF stocks, but these were arms that Lesotho had declared to be obsolete or unserviceable (Meek and Stott, 2003, pp. 38–47). It is not clear how many of the arms (or how much of the ammunition) that were seized and withdrawn from LDF stocks as either a direct or indirect result of Operation Boleas were recovered. Weapons from LDF stores reportedly later found their way into South Africa and were used in crimes and for the purposes of political violence in advance of the 1999 national elections (Buthelezi, 2002, p. 593).

Organizations—including the UN—almost always focus on the management of recovered arms and ammunition in an ad hoc manner, but this may soon change. The next section highlights various checks and balances to help prevent diversion, including initiatives under way to address this issue. ●

> “The ECOWAS Convention . . . is a legally binding regional measure of considerable potential importance for the proper management of arms and ammunition in peace operations . . . ECOWAS member states are among the most active peacekeepers in the world.”

## Control measures

Numerous control measures exist to reduce the loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations. For example, TCCs and PCCs have national guidelines and SOPs for managing their lethal and non-lethal materiel. These are sometimes supplemented by mission-specific controls. This section describes in general terms the broad measures in place, in both UN and non-UN operations, for managing arms and ammunition. (For a fuller account of operational checks and balances in UN missions, see Schroeder, 2016.)

## Politically binding control measures

### Noteworthy UN measures

With 70-plus years of peacekeeping experience, the UN has established numerous procedures that represent good practice and are far more extensive than those of most organizations undertaking peace operations.

The UN's checks and balances to secure peacekeepers' materiel are quite advanced, but they are unevenly implemented. Control measures the UN requires include predeployment assessments, the post-deployment recording of stocks, investigations into reported losses, and remuneration mechanisms for materiel that promote transparency. Some missions and certain PCCs and TCCs do a better job than others in conforming to these guidelines (Schroeder, 2016).

Gaps remain in the UN's oversight structures, but the organization is working to fill them. It has identified the management of recovered weaponry as a gap that needs to be addressed as a priority. In February 2018 the UN established a task force to review and revise its practices dealing with weapons, ammunition, and explosives management. This followed a UN initiative to enhance WAM in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, which resulted in a handbook promoting best practice (de Tessières, 2018).[42] The task force was subsequently transformed into two working groups comprising officials from four UN departments[43] and subject matter experts from UN member states. These two working groups are exploring a number of interrelated initiatives: the development of a UN WAM policy document; an ammunition manual focusing on field storage best practices; SOPs for dealing with the loss of weapons and ammunition in peace operations; and the development of an electronic record-keeping system at UN headquarters that will allow missions to report losses of arms and ammunition.

International guidelines also exist that are relevant to any discussion of WAM in peace operations. Examples include the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). A review of these measures is outside the scope of this paper, however.[44] Politically

binding measures such as the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA) are also vital to the topic but similarly fall outside the purview of this report.[45]

## Noteworthy EU measures

The EU has embarked on an ambitious multi-year programme to aid the BiH government to manage its ammunition, weapons, and explosives stockpiles; the programme also covers materiel that NATO forces recovered but did not destroy. As noted above, NATO's SFOR recovered significant quantities of arms and ammunition. (In 2003 alone—the sixth year of NATO's sustained efforts to recover arms and ammunition from civilians in BiH—the peace operation secured more than 10,000 weapons and almost 50,000 grenades (NATO, 2004).) Much of this materiel was destroyed, but the EU peace operation that succeeded SFOR, known as EUFOR Althea, took over the executive mandate to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement (Carapic and Holtom, 2018, pp. 5–7). In 2006 the armed forces of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH became a single entity with one military stockpile. Since 2013 the EU has assisted BiH to implement a comprehensive exercise to audit national military holdings of materiel and develop the government's capacities to manage its arms and ammunition, which includes safe and secure storage, transfer, and destruction (Carapic, Chaudhuri, and Gobinet, 2016; Carapic et al., 2018). The ability to replicate this exercise in other conflict and post-conflict settings is questionable, given the huge resources, lengthy time, and sustained political commitment that the undertaking requires. That said, the EU initiative certainly represents good practice and merits further examination.

## Noteworthy AU measures

The AU has also decided to develop its policies on recovered arms and ammunition. In March 2016 the AU Peace and Security Council took note of the important contribution AU peace operations played in countering the illicit proliferation of small arms, and requested the AU Commission to 'identify the requisite capacities in the pre-deployment assessment and planning phases of Council-mandated Peace Support Operations' (AU PSC, 2016). The AU has examined the role of peace operations in countering the illicit proliferation of small arms on the continent in its Silence the Guns 2020 initiative, and also established a process to develop a policy for what the forces of TCCs and PCCs in AU-mandated missions should do with recovered arms and ammunition. Toward this end, the AU, working with the Small Arms Survey, held a series of meetings between October 2017 and November 2018 (AU, 2017; 2018; forthcoming). In 2019 the AU plans to submit the draft policy to the Standing Advisory Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, and work to sensitize its member states and authorized and mandated peace operations to the new rules, as well as develop training modules and evaluation mechanisms to promote the policy.

## Legally binding control measures

### ECOWAS Convention

The ECOWAS Convention,[46] which was adopted in June 2006 and entered into force in September 2009, is a legally binding regional measure of considerable potential importance for the proper management of arms and ammunition in peace operations. Article 11 of the convention explicitly requires the organization's 15 member states[47] to report what small arms, light weapons, ammunition, parts, and accessories their forces participating in peace operations take into such operations, what they resupply, what they recover, what they destroy, and what they take with them when they withdraw from the mission (ECOWAS, 2006, art. 1; see Box 4). Implicitly, ECOWAS member states must also report on their forces' ammunition consumption and weapons losses. But this is not limited to ECOWAS peace operations: the convention requires ECOWAS member states to report to the ECOWAS Commission on their activities in *any* peace operation to which they contribute uniformed personnel. Because ECOWAS member states are among the most active peacekeepers in the world,[48] this control measure is potentially extremely important and represents best practice—on paper. To all intents and purposes, however, this measure has never been implemented.

**Box 4** Article 11 of the ECOWAS Convention: a register of arms and ammunition used in peacekeeping operations

1. Member States undertake to:
    a) Establish a register of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and other related material destined for use in peacekeeping operations both inside and outside the ECOWAS territory under the ECOWAS Executive Secretary as a way of ensuring the control of movements of small arms and light weapons and their effective withdrawal at the end of peace operations in which Member States are participating.
    b) Declare in this regard to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat all small arms and light weapons used in peace operations.
    c) Declare to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary all the small arms and light weapons seized, collected and/or destroyed during peace operations on their territory and in the ECOWAS region.
2. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall take the necessary measures to ensure the adequate recording of the information transmitted by the Member States participating to peace operations.
3. Records shall be permanently kept in the register.

Source: ECOWAS (2006, art. 11)

ECOWAS is actively working to support its member states to operationalize the ECOWAS Convention. In terms of Article 11, the ECOWAS Commission, with technical support from the Small Arms Survey, has developed reporting templates for its members to use to meet their commitments under the convention.

ECOWAS briefed member states on its efforts in Dakar in May 2018 and again in New York in June 2018 (on the margins of the PoA Third Review Conference). In July 2018 ECOWAS met in Banjul, the Gambia, with officials of its peace operation in that country. It plans to conduct additional briefings and training courses at its three Training Centres of Excellence. The Survey is supporting ECOWAS in these efforts.

## Kinshasa Convention

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) also has a legally binding small arms convention of note. Known as the Kinshasa Convention,[49] this instrument was adopted in April 2010 and entered into force in March 2017. Article 22 requires

**Box 5** Article 22 of the Kinshasa Convention: a subregional electronic database of weapons used in peacekeeping operations

1. The States Parties stipulate that the Secretary-General of ECCAS shall establish and maintain, in order to ensure control of their movement, a subregional electronic database of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly intended for use in peacekeeping operations.
2. The States Parties stipulate that the data, including data relating to weapons and ammunition collected during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations, shall be kept in the subregional database of weapons used in peacekeeping operations for a minimum of 30 years.
3. The States Parties stipulate that the Secretary-General of ECCAS, in conjunction with the States Parties, shall determine the modalities for the establishment and management of the subregional database of weapons used in peacekeeping operations, including all the areas to be covered.
4. The States Parties shall provide the Secretary-General of ECCAS with all the information to be included in the database of weapons used in peacekeeping operations, including information relating to marking procedures and all other relevant and related data.
5. All the data in the subregional database of weapons used in peacekeeping operations must also be kept by each State Party in a national register, in paper form, and by the Secretary-General of ECCAS in a subregional register in paper form.

Source: ECCAS (2010, art. 22)

ECCAS's 11 member states[50] to record the small arms their forces take into and out of peace operations (see Box 5). It differs from the ECOWAS Convention in that it is less specific in what it covers, and records must be kept for 'a minimum of 30 years' (ECCAS, 2010, art. 22, para. 2) instead of 'permanently', as the ECOWAS Convention requires (ECOWAS, 2006, art. 11, para. 3). In June 2018 ECCAS member states met in Yaoundé to discuss operationalizing the Kinshasa Convention, and special attention was paid to Article 22. While ECCAS has only undertaken a single peace operation, it is actively working to be prepared for additional missions. Moreover, as of December 2018 one of its members is the third-largest contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peace operations, with two other ECCAS members ranking in the top 20 (UNDPKO, n.d.). These and other ECCAS members also provide military and police to non-UN peace operations (see Table 2 and Annexe).

> “Some regional organizations have undertaken to create or implement existing controls to reduce the chances of diversion. The UN can benefit from commitments its member states have made as part of subregional frameworks that are more stringent than the UN’s requirements.”

## Conclusion

This report has shown that arms and ammunition from non-UN peace operations are regularly diverted to the illicit sphere. This includes both COE and recovered materiel. The losses from missions that non-UN organizations have fielded are considerable. They include thousands of small arms and millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as conventional weapons systems such as artillery and armoured vehicles. Armed groups obtain much of this materiel from attacks on peacekeepers' fixed sites, patrols, and convoy movements. Corrupt practices, difficult decisions made under some form of operational pressure, and political considerations also explain how materiel from peacekeepers enters the illicit realm.

Some regional organizations have undertaken to create or implement existing controls to reduce the chances of such diversion. Given overlapping memberships, some regional organizations (such as the LCBC) can benefit from the commitments their member states have made as part of other arms control frameworks (such as the ECOWAS Convention). This assumes an attention to detail and a congruency among organizations and arms control frameworks that currently do not exist, but may be changing. The UN can benefit from commitments its member states have made as part of regional frameworks that are more stringent than the UN's requirements.

This report has not examined several important issues that merit greater attention and further investigation. A partial list would include the effects the loss of non-lethal materiel (for example, fuel, uniforms, and vehicles) have on a peace operation's effectiveness; ways of distinguishing between preventable and unavoidable losses; and how an organization's checks and balances can be applied effectively to the forces of non-member states participating in a mission it undertakes. These issues have important implications for ongoing reform efforts to improve accountability and performance. Moreover, in many peacekeeping contexts civilian staff members play a key role in the collection and subsequent management of weapons. This may occur through voluntary arms collection programmes, or through the return of confiscated weapons to state and non-state actors. The present study has not covered this issue, just as it has not examined in detail ad hoc coalitions of the willing. The Survey, as part of its Making Peace Operations More Effective project, hopes to address each of these issues in the future.

# Annexe

**Table A1** Peace operations undertaken by organizations other than the UN*

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| ANAD | ANAD Observer Mission | 86–86 | Burkina Faso–Mali | 15 | No | **8** Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo |
| AU[c] (10) | AULMEE | 02–08 | Eritrea–Ethiopia | 35 | No | **6** Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia |
| | AMIB | 03–04 | Burundi | 3,100 | Yes | **9** Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia |
| | AMIS I | 04–04 | Sudan | 380 | Yes | **14**[d] Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, RoC, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan |
| | MIOC | 04–04 | Comoros | 40 | No | **8** Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo |
| | AMIS II | 04–05 | Sudan | 3,150 | Yes | **30**[e] Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, RoC, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | AMIS II-E | 05–07 | Sudan | 7,700 | Yes | **31**[f] Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, RoC, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| | AMISEC | 06–06 | Comoros | 1,200 | Yes | **8** DRC, Egypt, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa |
| | **AMISOM** | 07–present | Somalia | 22,000 | Yes | **12** Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe |
| | MISCA | 13–14 | CAR | 6,000 | Yes | **10** Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, RoC, Rwanda, Senegal |
| | AFISMA | 13–13 | Mali | 6,800 | Yes | **11** Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo |
| CEMAC | FOMUC | 03–08 | CAR | 500 | Yes | **4** Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, RoC |
| CEN-SAD | CEN-SAD | 01–03 | CAR | 300 | Yes | **3** Djibouti, Libya, Sudan |
| CIS (4) | **JCC** | 92–present | Moldova (Transnistria) | 2,100 | Yes | **3**[g] Moldova, RF, Ukraine |
| | JPKF | 92–08 | Georgia (South Ossetia) | 1,300 | Yes | **2**[h] Georgia, RF |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | CPKF | 93–00 | Tajikistan | 32,000 | Yes | **4** Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, RF, Uzbekistan |
| | CPKF | 94–08 | Georgia (Abkhazia) | 2,500 | Yes | **1** RF |
| Commonwealth (3) | CMF | 79–80 | Rhodesia[i] | 1,300 | Yes | **5** Australia, Fiji, Kenya, New Zealand, UK |
| | CPAG | 94–94 | South Africa | 35 | No | **6** Botswana, Canada, France, India, UK, Zimbabwe |
| | CPDTF | 98–00 | Sierra Leone | 10 | No | **5** Barbados, Canada, Sri Lanka, UK, Zimbabwe |
| CSCE | Mission to Georgia | 92–94 | Georgia | 10 | No | n/a |
| ECCAS | MICOPAX | 08–13 | CAR | 2,000 | Yes | **5** Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, RoC |
| ECOWAS (8) | ECOMOG | 90–99 | Liberia | 16,000 | Yes | **13** Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda |
| | ECOMOG | 97–99 | Sierra Leone | 13,000 | Yes | **4** Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria |
| | ECOMOG | 98–99 | Guinea-Bissau | 700 | Yes | **5** Benin, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Togo |
| | ECOMICI | 02–04 | Côte d'Ivoire | 1250 | Yes | **5** Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ECOMIL | 03–03 | Liberia | 3,600 | Yes | **8** Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo |
| | **ECOMIB** | 12–present | Guinea-Bissau | 600 | Yes | **4** Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo |
| | MICEMA[j] | 13–13 | Mali | 6,000 | Yes | **10** Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo |
| | **ECOMIG** | 17–present | Gambia | 3,000[k] | Yes | **3** Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal |
| EU[i] (27) | EUPM | 03–12 | BiH | 540 | Yes | **35** All 28 current EU member states + Canada, Iceland, Norway, RF, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine |
| | EUFOR Concordia | 03–03 | Macedonia | 400 | Yes | **26** All 28 current EU member states except 6 (Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ireland, Malta) + Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey |
| | IEMF | 03–03 | DRC | 2,000 | Yes | **17** Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK |
| | EUPOL Proxima | 03–05 | Macedonia | 200 | Yes | **28** All 28 current EU member states except 4 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Malta) + Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine |
| | **EUFOR Althea** | 04–present | BiH | 7,000 | Yes | **28** All 28 current EU member states except 5 (Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Malta, Norway) + Albania, Chile, Macedonia, Switzerland, Turkey |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | **EUBAM Rafah** | 05–present | Palestine (Gaza) | 50 | Yes | **21** All 28 current EU member states except 7 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia) |
| | EUPAT | 05–06 | Macedonia | 30 | No | **19** Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK |
| | **EUPOL COPPS** | 06–present | Palestine | 115 | No | **29** All 28 current EU member states + Canada |
| | EUPOL Kinshasa | 05–07 | DRC | 60 | No | **8** Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey |
| | EUSEC RDC | 05–16 | DRC | 60 | Yes | **15** Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK, US |
| | EUFOR RD Congo | 06–06 | DRC | 2,500 | Yes | **23** All 28 current EU member states except 7 (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Norway, Romania) + Switzerland, Turkey |
| | EUPOL Afghanistan | 07–16 | Afghanistan | 400 | Yes | **26** All 28 current EU member states except 3 (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slovenia) + Canada |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | EUPOL RDC | 07–14 | DRC | 50 | No | **11** Angola, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden |
| | EUFOR Tchad/ RCA | 08–09 | CAR–Chad | 4,300 | Yes | **26** All 28 current EU member states except 4 (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta) + Albania, RF |
| | EU SSR Guinea-Bissau | 08–10 | Guinea-Bissau | 25 | No | **6** France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden |
| | **EUMM** | 08–present | Georgia | 200 | No | **28** All 28 current EU member states |
| | **EULEX Kosovo** | 08–present | Kosovo | 2,000 | Yes | **33** All 28 current EU member states + Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, US |
| | **EUTM** | 10–present | Uganda, Somalia | 200 | Yes | **16** Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, UK |
| | **EUCAP Sahel** | 12–present | Niger | 125 | Yes | **14** Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK |
| | **EUCAP Somalia/ Nestor** | 12–present | Somalia | 175 | No | **26** Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK (+ 9 additional EU member states) |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | **EUTM** | 13–present | Mali | 575 | Yes | **29** All 28 current EU member states except 3 (Croatia, Malta, Norway) + Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Switzerland |
| | **EUAM** | 14–present | Ukraine | 175 | No | **32** All 28 current EU member states except 1 (Czech Republic) + Canada, Georgia, Switzerland, Turkey, US |
| | EUFOR RCA | 14–15 | CAR | 700 | Yes | **14** Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Spain |
| | **EUCAP Sahel** | 15–present | Mali | 200 | Yes | **16** Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK |
| | EUMAM RCA | 15–16 | CAR | 175 | Yes | **10** Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden |
| | **EUTM RCA** | 16–present | CAR | 175 | Yes | **13** Austria, Belgium, France, Georgia, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden |
| | **EUAM Iraq** | 17–present | Iraq | 35 | Yes | n/a |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLS[m] | (No name given) | 86–92 | Mozambique | 30,000 | Yes | **3** Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe |
| G5S | **FC-G5S** | 17–present | Burkina Faso–Mali–Niger | 5,000 | Yes | **5** Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger |
| GCC (3) | PSF | 90–91 | Kuwait | 5,000 | Yes | **5** Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE |
| | PSF | 03–03 | Kuwait | 10,000 | Yes | **4** Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE |
| | PSF | 11–11 | Bahrain | 30,000 | Yes | **2** Saudi Arabia, UAE |
| ICGLR (2) | JVM | 08–12 | DRC–Rwanda | 6 | No | **2** DRC, Rwanda |
| | **EJVM** | 12–present | DRC–Rwanda and environs | 30 | No | **12** Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Kenya, RoC, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia |
| IGAD (3) | VMT | 03–05 | Sudan | 50 | No | **10** Eritrea, Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, Sudan, Uganda, UK, US |
| | MVM | 14–15 | South Sudan | 80 | No | **12** Burundi, China, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Netherlands, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, UK, US |
| | **CTSAMM** | 15–present | South Sudan | 200 | No | **16** China, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Norway, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, UK, US |
| LAS (4) | ALF | 61–63 | Kuwait | 3,300 | Yes | **5** Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR[n] |
| | SASF | 76–76 | Lebanon | 2,500 | Yes | **5**[o] Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | ADF | 76–83 | Lebanon | 30,000 | Yes | **7**[o] Libya, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, UAE |
| | Arab League Observer Mission | 11–12 | Syria | 30[p] | No | **4** Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan |
| LCBC (2) | MNJTF | 98–n/a | Chad–Niger | n/a | n/a | **2** Chad, Niger |
| | **MNJTF** | 14–present | Nigeria | 10,000 | Yes | **5** Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria |
| MFO | **MFO** | 81–present | Egypt | 2,700 | Yes | **14** Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, UK, Uruguay, US |
| NATO[q] (15) | Op. Maritime Monitor | 92–92 | Adriatic Sea | n/a (7 vessels) | Yes | **5** France, Greece, Portugal, UK, US |
| | Op. Sky Monitor | 92–93 | BiH | n/a (member state air forces) | Yes | **13** Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, UK, US |
| | Op. Maritime Guard | 92–93 | Adriatic Sea | n/a (10 vessels) | Yes | **5** France, Greece, Portugal, UK, US |
| | Op. Deny Flight | 93–95 | BiH | 4,500 | Yes | **12** Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, UK, US |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Op. Sharp Guard | 93–96 | Adriatic Sea | n/a (20 vessels) | Yes | **14** Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, US |
| | IFOR | 95–96 | BiH | 60,000 | Yes | **33** All 29 current NATO allies except 10 (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Iceland, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia) + Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, BiH, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, RF, Sweden, Ukraine |
| | SFOR | 96–05 | BiH | 32,000 | Yes | **40** All 29 current NATO allies except 2 (Croatia, Montenegro) + Argentina, Australia, Austria, BiH, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, RF, Sweden |
| | **KFOR** | 99–present | Kosovo | 45,000 | Yes | **45** All 29 current NATO allies except 1 (Latvia) + Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, BiH, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Macedonia, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, UAE, Ukraine |
| | AFOR | 99–99 | Albania | 8,000 | Yes | **25** All 29 current NATO allies except 6 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Montenegro) + Austria, UAE |
| | Op. Essential Harvest | 01–01 | Macedonia | 4,650 | Yes | **14** Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey, UK |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | Op. Amber Fox | 01–02 | Macedonia | 1,000 | Yes | **9** Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain |
| | Op. Allied Harmony | 02–03 | Macedonia | 450 | Yes | **27** All 29 current NATO allies except 5 (Albania, Croatia, Denmark, Montenegro, US) + Austria, Finland, Sweden |
| | ISAF | 03–14 | Afghanistan | 130,000 | Yes | **49** All 29 current NATO allies + Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, BiH, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Tonga, UAE, Ukraine |
| | Op. Unified Protector | 11–11 | Libya | 8,000 | Yes | **32** All 29 current NATO allies except 1 (Montenegro) + Jordan, Qatar, UAE |
| | **RSM** | 15–present | Afghanistan | 16,900 | Yes | **39** All 29 current NATO allies except 2 (Canada, France) + Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, BiH, Finland, Georgia, Macedonia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Sweden, Ukraine |
| NNSC | **NNSC** | 53–present | North Korea–South Korea | 750 | Yes | **5** Czechoslovakia,[r] Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland |
| OAS (7) | Military Monitoring Committee | 48–49 | Costa Rica–Nicaragua | 15 | No | **5** Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, US |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Military Monitoring Committee | 55–55 | Costa Rica–Nicaragua | 30 | No | **5** Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, US |
| | Committee of Military Advisers | 57–57 | Honduras–Nicaragua | 20 | No | **9** Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, US, Venezuela |
| | OAS Commission | 59–59 | Panama | n/a | Yes | **5** Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, US |
| | IAPF | 65–66 | Dominican Republic | 14,000 | Yes | **7** Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, US |
| | Military Observers Mission | 69–71 | El Salvador–Honduras | 10 | No | **7** Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, US |
| | Military Observers Mission | 76–80 | El Salvador–Honduras | 30 | No | **12** Argentina, Uruguay, US + 9 other OAS member states |
| OAU (11) | NF I | 80–80 | Chad | 550 | Yes | **1** RoC |
| | NF II | 81–82 | Chad | 3,500 | Yes | **7** Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Zaire,[s] Zimbabwe |
| | MOT | 90–91 | Rwanda | 15 | Yes | **3** Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zaire[s] |
| | NMOG I | 91–92 | Rwanda | 40 | Yes | **4** Mali, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe |
| | NMOG II | 92–93 | Rwanda | 70 | Yes | **4** Nigeria, RoC, Senegal, Tunisia |
| | OMIB | 93–96 | Burundi | 70 | No | **6** Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Tunisia |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | OMIC I | 97–99 | Comoros | 25 | No | **4** Egypt, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia |
| | JMC | 99–01 | DRC | 45 | No | **5** Algeria, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe |
| | OLMEE | 00–02 | Eritrea–Ethiopia | 45 | No | **6** Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia |
| | OMIC II | 02–02 | Comoros | 15 | No | **7** Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo |
| | OMIC III | 02–02 | Comoros | 30 | No | **4** Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo |
| OECS | ECPF | 83–85 | Grenada | 400 | Yes | **7** Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, US |
| OSCE[t] (4) | Mission to Georgia[u] | 95–08 | Georgia | 175 | No | **33** Austria, Belarus, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, RF, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, US |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina** | 95–present | BiH | 300 | No | **32** Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, RF, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, US |
| | Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje | 01–10 | Macedonia | 90 | No | **26** Austria, Belarus, BiH, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, RF, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, US |
| | **Mission to Skopje** | 10–present | Macedonia | 155 | No | **24** Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, RF, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, US |
| PIF | RAMSI | 03–17 | Solomon Islands | 2,000 | Yes | **15** Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu |
| SADC (4) | OSLEG | 98–03 | DRC | 18,000 | Yes | **3**[v] Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe |
| | Op. Boleas | 98–99 | Lesotho | 1,370 | Yes | **2** Botswana, South Africa |

| Organization[a] (No. of missions) | Mission (red bold= active) | About the mission | | | | Participating states (Total no. of PCCs and TCCs in red bold,[b] followed by contributing countries) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Years authorized/ deployed | Deployed to | Approximate maximum strength | Armed? Yes/No | |
| | SOMILES | 14–15 | Lesotho | 200 | Yes | **6** Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe |
| | **SAPMIL** | 17–present | Lesotho | 300 | Yes | **7** Angola, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe |
| WEU (4) | Op. Sharp Guard[w] | 93–96 | Adriatic Sea | n/a (20 vessels) | Yes | **14** Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, US |
| | WEU Danube | 93–96 | Danube River | 250 | Yes | **8** Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK |
| | Task Force Mostar | 94–96 | BiH | 180 | Yes | **10** Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK |
| | MAPE | 97–01 | Albania | 160 | No | **27** Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK |

Notes:

* See the 'List of abbreviations and acronyms' for the full names of organizations, peace operations, and countries given in abbreviated form in the table.

a See endnote 12.

b PCCs include countries providing individual police officers and/or formed police units. TCCs include countries providing military observers, headquarters staff, and formed units.

c See endnote 13.

d The deputy chair of the Ceasefire Commission, which formed part of AMIS I, was a French military officer provided by the EU. This contribution is not included in the list of TCCs for this mission.

e Five non-African countries contributed personnel to support the mission as part of a separate assistance team: Canada, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the United States. These contributions are not included in the list of TCCs provided.

f Eleven non-African countries contributed personnel to support the mission as part of a separate assistance team: Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These contributions are not included in the list of TCCs provided.

g The territory of Transnistria, which is not commonly recognized as a state and not a UN member state, also contributed troops.

h The territories of North Ossetia and South Ossetia, which are not commonly recognized as states and not UN member states, also contributed troops.

i Rhodesia is now known as Zimbabwe.

j ECOWAS feels strongly that the initial deployment in Mali was an ECOWAS force, based on its planning and preparations earlier in 2013. It believes that AFISMA started only when the AU special representative, Pierre Buyoya, joined the mission in mid-February, several weeks after the operation had commenced.

k Initial reports commonly placed the mission's strength at more than twice this number. This is because Senegal supplemented the official ECOWAS mission personnel with additional troops who were not part of ECOMIG, which commentators and observers did not distinguish as separate from the peace operation.

l As of December 2018 the EU had 28 member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

m The FLS was a coalition of states that supported the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. It did not have a standing secretariat, but its members met frequently and coordinated policies for more than two decades. The Survey treats the decision of two of its members (Tanzania and Zimbabwe) to deploy troops in Mozambique to support the government in Maputo against attacks from the RENAMO insurgency as a peace operation. Malawi, which was not an FLS member, also deployed troops to this operation.

n The United Arab Republic (UAR) was a political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961. Egypt continued to call itself the UAR until 1971.

o The Palestine Liberation Organization, which joined the LAS in 1976 as a member, contributed uniformed personnel to both the SASF and ADF peace operations.

p At least 30 of the 160-plus observers from the LAS mission were active military personnel from Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Sudan. Ten other LAS member states (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen) apparently only provided civilian personnel to the mission.

q As of December 2018 NATO had 29 member states—or 'allies', as the organization calls them: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

r Czechoslovakia dissolved into two countries in 1993: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic subsequently assumed responsibilities for the NNSC.

s Zaire changed its name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997.

t The Survey was not able to distinguish between countries that contributed uniformed personnel to the four OSCE missions listed here and those that only contributed civilian personnel (as it was able to do for the Arab League Observer Mission to Syria; see above). The maximum strengths for each of the four missions are provided here. The number of police or military in the mission would have been smaller. For this reason, the number of TCCs/PCCs and the names of countries appear in blue.

u The OSCE's Mission to Georgia started in 1992 as a peace operation of the OSCE's predecessor, the CSCE. The small contingent of fewer than ten unarmed uniformed military personnel serving in the CSCE and OSCE missions since shortly after 1992 more than doubled after the 2008 war. The Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje also began as a CSCE mission in 1992, but did not contain a uniformed police component until 2001.

v The Survey does not consider that Chad participated in OSLEG, even though the Chadian government sent troops to the DRC to support that country's government. Nor does it consider that Sudan participated in the SADC mission, even though the Sudanese government provided military aircraft and personnel to assist the Kabila government in the DRC.

w The WEU joined the NATO mission Operation Sharp Guard in 1993, a year after NATO's initial deployment for Operation Maritime Monitor, joining the two organizations' forces under a new mandate (WEU, n.d.).

Source: Berman and Brehm (2018)

# Endnotes

1 Indeed, the loss of life among peacekeepers in non-UN peace operations due to hostile action is considerably greater than the losses UN missions have suffered, as just two missions indicate. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia lost more than 100 peacekeepers a year on average in this way over its first six years of operations (Howe, 1996, p. 146). More recently, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (which does not publicize casualties its troop contributors have incurred) is widely believed to have lost many hundreds of peacekeepers due to hostile action (see Williams, 2015).

2 For example, the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) effectively side-stepped the issue. It used 'peace operations' to cover a variety of UN deployments (for example, peacekeeping operations and special political missions) without explicitly defining the term (UNGA and UNSC, 2015, para. 50).

3 Some civilian missions have VIP protection units that are armed.

4 Indeed, some organizations listed in this report do not use this term to describe some of their own missions that are listed in this study.

5 The definition of small arms used in this report differs from the UN's definition in that it includes mortar systems up to and including 120 mm. The definition adopted by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts capped mortar calibres at less than 100 mm, but this had more to do with political considerations than with portability.

6 The NNSC has been operational on the Korean Peninsula since 1953, and the MFO in the Sinai Peninsula since 1981. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron has been operational since 1997 (and dates back to 1994), but since it only comprises civilian personnel (TIPH, n.d.), it is not included here.

7 Some organizations listed in this report do not use this term to describe the missions included in this study.

8 Some missions may include police or troops from the host country.

9 Missions that adhere to other criteria listed here, but that 'only' clear mines, ward off piracy attempts, or interdict human trafficking are not included here.

10 These criteria exclude a number of missions that other researchers and practitioners often refer to as 'peace operations', including humanitarian operations and those that deploy only with civilian personnel. It also excludes what the UN calls 'Special Political Missions', whose only active military personnel belong to VIP security units protecting the mission staff.

11 The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries explored the possibility of deploying a peace operation in lusophone country Guinea-Bissau in response to crisis in that country in 1998, but ultimately deferred to ECOWAS to take the lead in fielding a mission (see Berman and Sams, 2000, pp. 368–70).

12 The five organizations that no longer exist include the Treaty of Non-aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Frontline States (FLS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Western European Union (WEU), which ceased operations in 2001, 1994, 1994, 2002, and 2011, respectively.

13 Several organizations—including the AU, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—have authorized missions that have not deployed. Moreover, the AU makes clear distinctions among missions it authorizes but does not lead; those it both authorizes and leads; and missions its predecessor, the OAU, authorized and the AU subsequently assumed control of. The missions listed in the Annexe do not include those that the AU authorized but does/did not lead (for example, the MNJTF and RCI-LRA; see Table 2). The AU considers UNAMID to be an AU peace operation, but it is not included here, because this list includes only non-UN peace operations, which UNAMID is not. The Survey counts those missions the AU has authorized but does not lead as ad hoc if no other organization is linked to their deployment.

14 The AU, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ECOWAS, the FLS, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the League of Arab States (LAS), NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) all fielded missions of 10,000 or more armed uniformed personnel. The Commonwealth, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the EU, the Group of Five Sahel (G5S), the MFO, the OAU, and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) have fielded missions with more than 1,000 armed uniformed personnel, but fewer than 10,000.

15 The five largest missions alone—the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the G5S Joint Force (FC-G5S), the LCBC's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Kosovo Force (KFOR)—account for 55,000 military and police. (See this report's Annexe, and please note that in 2018 NATO's RSM and KFOR missions were below their historic maximum strengths, but still totalled some 20,000 uniformed personnel; see NATO (2018a; 2018b).)

16 The UN did not respond positively to Survey requests for historical and complete information for this report on countries contributing police and/or military to UN peace operations. The Survey compared UN data going back to 1993 that the UN provides on its website to information the Survey has compiled on peace operations undertaken by non-UN organizations, which dates back to 1948. This exercise suggests that eight more UN member states have contributed to peace operations undertaken by organizations and ad hoc coalitions than have those who contribute only to UN peacekeeping missions; see also Williams and Nguyen (2018). Specifically, 22 UN member states have provided uniformed personnel to only non-UN-led missions (Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iraq, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Uzbekistan); whereas 14—or possibly 16—UN member states have contributed police and military to UN missions only (not including deployments of the forces of ad hoc coalitions). The 14 are the Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vietnam. Additionally, it is not clear if Belarus and Japan

provided civilians or uniformed personnel to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) missions with small cells of uniformed personnel. If not, then these two countries should be added to this list; see Brehm (2018). The Survey counts troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) participating in UNAMID as contributing to both an AU and a UN peace operation. Brunei has contributed to an ad hoc peace operation.

17 This list includes the Cook Islands, the Justice and Equality Movement, Niue, North Ossetia, the Palestine Liberation Organization, South Ossetia, the Sudan Liberation Army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and Transnistria.

18 The EU, which in December 2018 had 28 members, has had 17 non-member states contribute military or police to its 26 missions: Albania, Angola, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, the Russian Federation, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. NATO, which in December 2018 had 29 members—or 'allies', as they are called—has had 26 non-member states contribute military or police to its 15 missions: Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Jordan, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Togo, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Ukraine.

19 Additional ad hoc peace operations would include the four-country Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, the five-country Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, and the six-country International Peace Monitoring Team in the Solomon Islands.

20 In UNAMID, for example, a private company was responsible for a delivery of ammunition to the peacekeeping force that was seized while it was being transported; see Berman and Racovita (2015, p. 76).

21 For a listing of specific incidents, including estimations of losses, see Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder (2017, pp. 28–31, 37).

22 Written correspondence with MFO official, 11 August 2017.

23 Author interview with former MFO peacekeeper, 23 November 2018.

24 An article citing knowledgeable government sources on attacks on just one TCC in just one non-UN peace operation reported that 14 infantry bases of the TCC in question had to be shut down or had been overrun by insurgents in 2018 (Salkida, 2019).

25 The Survey understands that this company position inside Somalia was outside of the formal composition of AMISOM, but still considered part of the sector operations of the TCC (author interview with former AMISOM TCC official, East Africa, 9 November 2018). A supplemental deployment outside of a formal agreement is not common, but neither is it unprecedented.

26 See, for example, Ibekwe (2015). The Revolutionary United Front also reportedly seized tanks from ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone (Musah, 2000, p. 109).

27 See, for example, Berman (2000, p. 18); Adeshina (2002, pp. 128–34); Adebajo (2002, pp. 108, 139, 187).

28 This estimate is considerably higher than the previous one: see Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder (2017, p. 30). It is based on an author interview with a former AMISOM official in Nairobi on 14 March 2018. The Survey now estimates that al-Shabaab effectively disarmed (and killed) two infantry platoons, but views this as a conservative number.

29 Reports that a deal had been reached in terms of which the garrison had been airlifted out—see, for example, Prunier (2009, p. 232)—appear not to be true. The besieged SADC force did receive occasional resupply and medevac support from fast patrol boats and transport aircraft (Cooper, 2016, pp. 56–57).

30 The SADC forces claimed to have recovered all their materiel at Ikela airport (written correspondence with regional conflict author Tom Cooper, 13 November 2018).

31 ECOMOG forces provided lethal materiel as well as logistical support and intelligence to several armed groups in Liberia after the arms embargo was in place (Howe, 1996, pp. 156–57).

32 See, for example, Adeshina (2002, p. 103); UNSC (2013, p. 287); Diop (2018); Williams (2018, p. 252).

33 The materiel in question included 88 'flashbang' grenades, 600 12-calibre rubber ball cartridges, and 12 signal cartridges (UNSC, 2014, para. 180), as well as what might be described as indirect crowd-control material: office furniture and equipment, tools to repair vehicles, outdoor showers, and a washing machine (ERR News, 2014). The problem with the grenades and cartridges was that the TCC in question did not notify the sanctions committee in advance of the transfer (UNSC, 2014, para. 180) and did not therefore receive an exemption as required.

34 Transparency International's study on corruption in 2013 focused largely on procurement and contracting irregularities; the mismanagement of arms and ammunition was not covered; see TI UK (2013).

35 The Survey considers the troops from Chad and Sudan that served in the DRC not to have been part of the SADC mission Operation Sovereign Legitimacy, but to comprise an ad hoc peace operation, even if their motives differed and if regional support was more implicit than explicit. Categorizing this peace operation constitutes a highly problematic grey area.

36 See UNSC (2008, paras. 140–45) and Berman (2008, p. 57), respectively.

37 Uganda, for example, has acknowledged that some of its troops serving in AMISOM have sold ammunition—and has court-martialled some of its soldiers who have been found guilty of this offence. Uganda People's Defence Force personnel, including officers, have also been court-martialled for selling rations and fuel (Somalia Newsroom, 2016; AMISOM, 2016). Ugandan troops are not alone in engaging in such activities, but the Ugandan government is more open about acknowledging such behaviour than are most governments.

38 The materiel discussed in this section does not include weapons and ammunition that peacekeepers record as part of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, which can also result in the diversion of materiel, but are not part of this study.

39 Former president Yahya Jammeh, who seized power in a bloodless coup in 1994 and then refused to step down after losing elections in 2016, procured this materiel in contravention of the ECOWAS Small Arms Convention. The convention requires member states to inform ECOWAS of their materiel-related plans, and receive an exemption from the regional bloc's moratorium to allow procurement.

40 In May 2017, for example, ECOWAS undertook a technical assessment of the safety and security status of the Gambian armed forces' arms and ammunition. The Bonn International Center for Conversion and the Mines Advisory Group supported the two-week mission (ECOWAS, 2017, pp. 7–8).

41 NATO's KFOR, in cooperation with partners, collected more than 4,000 weapons and half a million rounds of ammunition (Perry, 2004, p. 8), and its Operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia recovered some 3,800 weapons, as well as ammunition (Gilmore, 2001).

42 The handbook is available in both English and French. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) are developing training courses to support the handbook's effectiveness.

43 The four departments are the Department of Field Support, UNDPKO, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of Safety and Security. A knowledgeable participant described

the working groups and the initiatives at the Third Regional MPOME Workshop in October 2018, which was jointly hosted by Uruguay and the Small Arms Survey, at the National Peace Operations Training Institute of Uruguay (see Mc Evoy, 2019).

44 MOSAIC was previously known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS); see UNODA (n.d.) for additional information. Several modules in Series 05 (Operational Support) are of relevance to WAM in peace operations: 'Stockpile Management: Weapons' (Module 05.20); 'Marking and Recordkeeping' (05.30); 'Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons' (05.31); and 'Destruction: Weapons' (05.50). To learn more about the IATG, see UNODA (2015). For a succinct summary of each IATG module, see Carapic et al. (2018, Annexe 2). Numerous modules within the various guidelines—too many to mention here—will be of relevance to ammunition management in peace operations.

45 The full name of this instrument is the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNGA, 2001). The PoA and its International Tracing Instrument address such important checks and balances as physical security and stockpile management, and marking, tracing, and record-keeping.

46 The full title of this instrument is ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS, 2006).

47 The 15 members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

48 In December 2018 six ECOWAS member states were among the top 25 TCCs and PCCs to UN peace operations (UNDPKO, n.d.). As the Annexe to this report shows, ECOWAS member states have also been very active in peace operations that the AU (and its predecessor, the OAU) and LCBC have undertaken—and, of course, ECOWAS missions. They have also participated in ad hoc operations (see Table 2).

49 The full name of this instrument is the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components that Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (ECCAS, 2010).

50 The 11 members of ECCAS are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

# Correspondence and interviews

Author correspondence with Zinurine Alghali, head, Policy Development Unit, Peace Support Operations Division, Peace and Security Department, AU Commission, 27 November and 17 December 2018.

Author telephonic interview and correspondence with Andrew Charlton, senior Common Security and Defence Policy adviser, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, European External Action Service, EU, 12 September 2018 and 9 November 2018, respectively.

Author correspondence with Ruth Feeney, strategic communications officer, CTSAMM, 21 November 2018.

Author correspondence with Wilson Twinomugisha Kajwengye, director for peace and security, Executive Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 17 December 2018.

Author interview with Colonel Kouame Attoumgbré Joseph, head, Military Component, Strategic Assessment & Doctrine, Peace Support Operations Division, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, 19 January 2018.

Author correspondence with Robin Mossinkoff, head, Forum for Security Cooperation Support Unit, OSCE, 1 and 2 November 2018.

Author correspondence with Singo Mwachofi, lecturer in Political Science, University of Nairobi, and research consultant, Security Research and Information Centre, 29 October, and 16 December 2018.

Author correspondence with Marie-Pierre Olivier, legal adviser, Legal Policy, Rule of Law Section, Governance and Peace Directorate, Commonwealth Secretariat, 11 September 2018.

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Author correspondence with Sani Adamu Mohammed, programme officer, Small Arms Division, Directorate of Peacekeeping and Regional Security, ECOWAS Commission, 2 January 2019.

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